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Social Movements 
Michael Diamond • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Various group;; of people have been the victims of oppre;sion throughout 
time and across national borders and cultures. Many form; of oppression 
continue to exist all over the world today, including in the United States. I have 
been particularly concerned with oppression on the ba;is of race. 1 The 
response; to oppression have taken many forrm, ranging from pmsivity and 
acquiescence to rebellion. Much of the response, however, takes place between 
these extremes, often in the form of ongoing collective action by more or less 
organized groups. Broadly speaking, the;e actions have c"ome to be known as 
social movements, and they have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly 
examination. 2 Through this scholarship, we have learned much about the nature 
of social movements, who joins them, and how they have been able to succeed. 
We have not learned as much about how the law and lawyers affect such 
movements and how, if at all, law and lawyers contribute to their success. I 
would like to examine these issues in an effort to elucidate the relationship 
between law, lawyers, and social movements and to better understand how 
lawyers can be helpful (or detrimental) to such movements . 
My own interest in this field is somewhat more narrowly confmed. For 
example, I have been skeptical of movements md lawyers who set a; their goal 
the e>tablishment of new or expansion of existing legal rights. New rights do 
• Professor of Law, G!orgetown University Law Center. An earlier version of this paper was 
pre!Ented at a symposium on Law, Lawyers, and Social Movements held at G!orgetown Law, Fall 
2016. I want to ex1Jress thanks to my friends and colleagues, G!ny ~ann and Mike Seidman, fort reir 
very useful comments on drafts oft his essay . © 20 17, Michael Diarnooo. 
1. By oppressbn, I an1 referring to the reS.raint , miS.reatment , expbitation, and/or reS.riction of 
oppottmities of people on accollflt of their race or ethnicity . The oppression may be the result of 
governmental policy ,social norms, ora combinationofboth 
2. To be clear, &>cia! moven-ents may operate for any mmber of causes, not merely on behalf of 
the oppressed. There are, for example, movements in stpport of the Second An-emknent and again!t 
gtm control again!t reproductive choice, and in favor of populist presidential candidates and tl-eir 
policies. I an1 focusing solely on those that deal with racial and ethnic oppression in this essay. 
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not seem to have mt£h social or political impact on subordinated groups , unless 
the holders of those rights have the power to enforce them. As an alternative to 
the rights discourse, I have been interested in the acquisition and utilization of 
power by marginalized and oppressed group;; in the United States. Even more 
narrowly, my research has focused primarily on issues affecting the urban poor. 
Historically, there has been a significant intersection connecting social 
movements to urban poverty. The Civil Rights Movement, the Welfare Rights 
Movement, the Affordable and Fair Housing Movements, the Affordable Health 
Care Movement, and the Black Lives Matter Movement, among others, have 
had significant impetus from and impact on the urban poor. 
Many of these movements st£ceeded in creating new rights for various 
groups . Many were St£cessful in changing, to some extent, individual lives and 
social environments. Never1heless, we see today a society where wealth and 
well-being are even more polarized, 3 often on the basis of race, 4 and group; of 
people who remain subject to the same form; of intergenerational oppression as 
those faced by their long departed ancestors. These group;; continue to exist on 
the wrong side of what I have previously called the "power deficit. "5 If this 
assertion is corn~c~ the dedicated and well-intentioned efforts of lawyers have 
had only marginal results. Thus, I take the position, m do several others, that 
lawyers who work with oppressed groups must msist them in gaining and using 
power rather than pursuing rights as an end in themselves . 
That being said, there is little consensus among social scientists, 
philosophers, and lawyers on the meaning of power and virtually no legal 
literature on how it can be obtained and used (although a fair ammmt exists on 
the need to obtain and utilize it). "Of all the concepts used by sociologists, few 
are the source of more confusion or misunderstanding than power. " 6 My 
intention in this paper is to dispel some of that confusion and to attempt to 
illuminate some issues concerning power in relation and as a response to 
oppression. 
For many years, I have attempted to understand the concept of "power" as 
applied to social and political interactions. There hm been a great deal of 
literature concerning the application of power upon subordirrated group; in the 
United States and about the effects of that application. 7 There is literature 
3. This is not to say that all members of mcial minorities are worse off now than they were at the 
beginning of the Civil Rights Movement. It is to !ay that the progress achieved~ large se~nents of 
minority populatbns has been slower and less substartial than for mo~ of their majority comtetparts. 
and, in some cases, there has been little to no progress at all. 
4. For a discussion of the !tati!ti:s and eronomics of the position of minorities in tre United 
States, see generally BRENDAN O 'FlAHERlY, THE ECONOMICS OF RACE IN 11-IE UNITED STA 'illS 
(20 15). 
5. Michael Diamond, Community Eamomic Development: A Reflection on Communi"y· Power. 
and the Law, 81. SMALL &EMERGING BUS. L. 151 , 160(2004). 
6. GERHARD E. LENS!<.!, POWER AND PRIVlLEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL S1RA TIFICA 110N 50 
(1966). 
7. See, e.g., MIOffiLLE ALEXANDER, THE NEw JIM CROW (2010); SETHARD FISHER, ED., POWER 
AND 1HE BLAO<. COMMUNilY : A READER ON RACIAL SuBORDINATDN IN1HE U.S. ( 1970); HERBERT 
1. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST lHE P OOR (1995); DoUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, 
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discu;sing the "anpowerment" of subordinated populations, 8 but it does not 
really define "power" ~ it is utilized against such group;, or "empowerment" as 
a way to rectify existing wrongs done to them Many grou}l) in the United 
States can realistically claim to have been (and continue to be) the objects of 
power and to be disadvantaged or even oppressed by it. 9 However, my 
particular concern is with power in relation to those who are beset by 
subordination and urban poverty, particularly people of color. More 
specifically, I am concerned with long term and intergenerational poverty as 
opposed to temporary or voluntary poverty. 10 
In previous attanpts to put my concerns on paper, I have explored, I hope 
with an increasing level of sophistication, the sources and uses of power. 11 The 
previous explorations have progressed from one that examined a behavioral 
approach concerning the defmition and exercise of power to one that considered 
a more nuanced understanding of power and the roots of the power imbalance. 
In this article, I sought to flesh out the latter approoch, an approoch that Antonio 
Gramsci, in reconstituting a Marxian concept, called the "hegemonic" ~pect of 
power. 12 I also sought in this article to identify and discuss the means by which 
lawyers might assist the poor in reducing the power deficit. 
This inquiry is highly relevant in a discu;sion of social movements, becau;e 
there has been a widespread and deep, albeit not always well coordinated, 
movement against poverty and oppression for well over half a century. Lawyers 
have been significantly involved in this movement and have often assisted in 
the ochievement of important improvements in the circwnstances of those 
subjected to poverty and dis~rimination. Part of what I argue here is that the 
lawyers and, to some extent, the movanents themselves , often mistake legal 
victories for ultimate success. While that pooition has largely been discredited, 
remnants of it pers ist among lawyers and non-lawyers alike. As an alternative 
view, I would like to focus attention on 1he issue of power, its definition, 
accumulation, and u;e. It is by occumulating and using power that social 
movements achieve goals. Lawyers and, occasionally, the law are parts of that 
accumulation and use, but, in my view, hardly of their essence. 
AMERICAN APAR'IHEID : SEGREGATION AND lHE MAKING OF 1liE UNDERCLA1B (1993); AlvON N. 
Wn..s:>N, BLUEPRINT R)R BLAa<. POWER: A MORAL, POLITICAL AND ECDNOMIC IMI'ERA llVE FOR lHE 
TWEN1Y-FIRSTCEN11JRY (1998). 
8 . See generally Michael Diamond, Cbmmunity La-.ryering: Revisiting the Old Neighborlwod, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking 
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Ebc. CHANGE 369 
( 1983); Stepren Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 ( 1970). 
9 . Consider, for example, the situation of wom:n, ra::ial minorities, gay, lesbian, or t ransgendered 
people, children, or theelderly. 
10. By the term "volmtruy poverty ," I n.:an people who have cho~n to live wit holt means. Too 
typical exan1plesaremembersoftre clergy and the so-called "starving a rtist." 
11. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 5; Mi:hael Diamond, Community Eamom ic Development and 
the Parodox of Power, I IRJSH REV. COM\flJNllY ECDN. DEV. L. & POL'Y 5 (2012) [hereinafter 
Paradox}. 
12 . ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM "IHE PRISON NoTEBOOKS OF AN10NIO GRAI\If3CI 12 
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., 1971). 
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As I have suggested, the defmition and exploration of social power is not 
new. In fa;t, social power ha:; been a topic of scholarly examination for 
centuries. As early as the sixteenth century, when Machiavelli published The 
Prince, 13 theoreticians, including Spinoza, 14 Hegel, 15 Weber! 6 and many o1her, 
more contemporary, theoret~ians , 17 have devoted suootantial thought and 
contributed substmtial content to the discourse. Until the 1960s, most of the 
prominent commentators defined power as the ability of the powerful to cause 
the non-powerful to do what the powerful party desires despite opposition from 
the non-powerful party. 18 
This conceptualization implicates the idea of what has been called " power 
over" one by mother. This aphoristic expression may have been a generally 
accurate description of the fi.mction of power at one point in history. While it is 
still accurate in some situations today, for some time it has been less descriptive 
of how power operates in the modern world. More contemporary contributors to 
the public discourse on power have considered the concept of "power to" rather 
than "power over." Perhaps an even larger change in thinking about power has 
come from many modern theorists who have argued that the situs of power has 
become opaque and, in many ca:;es, Ulidentifiable. I believe that both of these 
modem views more corroctly situate the source and nature of power. I discrns 
these issues more fully in Section 2, infra. 
While there are some identifiable sites in which the a;quisition and 
emanation of power takes place, there is also a body of power that emanates 
from less discernible or even indiscernible or non-existent sites. Such opacity, if 
accurately describing modern forms of power, makes efforts to combat it 
fundamentally different from combating traditional power emanating from 
observable sources. In this paper, I wish to explore these modern views of social 
13 . NICOOLO MAGIIAVELq THE PRINCE (HaJVey C. Mansfield trans. , Univ. Oli. Press 2d ed 
1998) (1532). 
14. BARUCH SPINOZA , TRACTATIJS POLITICUS (Michrel Silverthorne & .k>mthan Israel trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) ( 1677). 
15. See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDERIGI HEGEL, LEC.IURES ON 11-IE HISlORY OFPHIL09:>PHY 
(E.& Haldane& FrancesH. Simson trans., Univ. Neb. Press 1995)(1840). 
16 . MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOC!ElY: AN 0UTI..INE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOOY 53 
(Guenther Roth& Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
17 . Dennis H. Wrong has said, "Power is the capacity of !Orne persons to produce intended 
and foreseen effects on otl~rs." DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES 2 
(fmnStcti:m Publishers 5th ed. 2009) (1 979). Amitai Etzcni has defined power as the "capacity 
to overco~ part or all of the resi!tance, to introduce changes in the face of opposition. " AMITAI 
ETZION~ THE ACTIVE S0CIE1Y: A THEORY OF SOCIETAL AND POLillCAL PROCESSES 3 14 
(1968). Other definitc nshave al!D been suggested by other social scienti!ts. Many of these have 
been compiled by Paul Mott. He quotes, arrong others, " Goldlammer and Shils: A person has 
power ' to the extent that he influeoces the behavior of others in accordance with his own 
intentions.' Weber: Power is the probability that one actor within a social relat unship will be in a 
position to cany out his own will, delpite resi!tances, regardless of the basis on whi.:h this 
probability re!ts. Bier!ted: Power is latent foiCe." Paul E. Mott, Power, Aud10rity and Influence. 
in THE SrRUCTIJRE OFCOMMUNllY POWER 3, 5 (Michael Aiken & Paul E. Mott eds .. 1970). fur 
further discussion on hi!tori:al examinations of social power, see, e.g., Diamond, supra note 5, at 
158. 
18. See infra Section II. 
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power, particularly views that address the more ethereal sources and forms of 
power, with which I substantially agree. The results of such an exploration will, 
1 hope, help to inform the strategies and actions of movement leaders and the 
lawyers who assist them. 
In pursuing this examination of social power and its use, I would initially like 
to set some limiting parameters. First, I propose to eliminate from this 
discu:;sion the ideas of coercion and physical force as sources of power. While 
the threat of force, partcularly by the State, often underlies the exercise of 
social power, there is also a body of thought to the effect that, if force is 
required to induce compliance, there is, in f~t. an absence of real power. In this 
view, the u:;e of force implicates a failure of power.19 Regardless of one's view 
of force in relation to power, the use of direct force or coercion is suffteiently 
unsubtle as to make its u:;e as a foundation for a discu:;sion of power 
significantly less interesting or desirable. Moreover, it is more likely that force 
or coercion will be observable and, potentially, resisted The other forms of 
power I cornider in this essay are far more covert and, therefore, less easily 
identified and resisted. 
Second, as I have mentioned, while the State and various centralized 
institutions have traditionally been thought to be the situs of power, I will 
discu:;s a decentralized and somewhat more elusive view of power, one in 
which an identifiable source of emanation is lacking or, perhaps more precisely, 
non-existent If this description of power, its source, and its exercise is largely 
accurate, this should have significant implications for the role and activities of 
strategists and lawyers who participate in movement struggles against 
oppression and subordination. For example, depending on the way one 
conceives of power, there will be significant variation in what lawyers and other 
activists do and in the target of their activities. I hope, in this paper, to elucidate 
some of these differences. 
In laying out my position, I will, in Section II, briefly trace the modern 
treatments of the concept of power, particularly those that fall within the 
behaviorist school of thought, the structuralist school, and, fmally, the post-
structuralist school. In Section III, I will address the question of power in 
relation to the problem of urban poverty in the United States. In Section IV, I 
will revisit the strategies by which the poor and their allies might resist the 
impositions of power against them and increase their ability to use power 
productively, thereby reducing the power deficit they confront I will conclude, 
in Section V, with some final thoughts on the nature and use of power. 
II. THE POWER DISCOURSE IN MODERN HISfORY 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, several influential writers have 
re-examined the meaning and operation of power. These writers may be 
19. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1969), reprinted in POWER: A READER 132, 137 (Marl< 
Haugaarded , 2002). 
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grouped into three broad but distinct schools of thought about social power: 
behavioral/conflict; false consciousness; structuralist; and post-structuralist. 
A. The Three Faces of Power 
1. The First Face of Power: The Behaviorist School 
One of the most prevalent theories of power during the mid-twentieth 
century derived from Weber's view of power which involved a person, "A", 
being able to cause another, "B", to do what A wishes despite B' s resistance10 
This model of power relies on the conflict between A and B, and provides the 
basis for the pa;ition of Rooald Dahl, one of the major writers about power in 
the mid-late twentieth centW)'. Dahl's formulation of Weber's theory is "A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do. " 21 
Dahl's view of power was highly empirical. 22 He claimed that there must be 
an observable cause and effect relationship between the a;ts of the powerful and 
the respoose of the target.23 Therefore, Dahl distinguished between power and 
the potential for power.24 Merely having access to resources does not make a 
person powerful. That person must marshal and successfully utilize those 
resources to cause others to act in order to be said to have or to have exercised 
power.25 Dahl goes on to argue that power is not the domain of any particular 
person or group of people. · 
This is in contrast to the position taken by C. Wright Mills, in his book The 
Power Elite. 26 Mills theorized that there existed a group of elites in particular 
fields (such as the military, political institutions and major participants in 
industry) who make decisions that, consciously or unconsciously, affect 
national and international policy. 27 Dahl criticized Mills ' elitist view, arguing 
that there existed a fluid set in interests that competed for supremacy on any 
particular point. He posited a pluralistic society and believed that the ability to 
acquire and utilize power is distributed widely and is unstable. Thus, tha;e who 
may be powerful in one area of a;tivity may be without power in another.28 
Nevertheless, Dahl maintained that the element of power depended upon the 
existence of an oooervable conflict between these competing groups with the 
successful group on any issue having "power" in connection with that issue. 
20. See WEBER, supra note 16. 
21 . Robert A. Dahl, The Concept ofPower, 2 SYS. RES. ANDBEHAV. SCI., 201,202-203 (1957) . 
22. Robert A . Dahl, Power, in POWER: A READER 9, 16 (MarkHaugaarded., 2002). 
23 . Robert A. Dahl, Power as the Control of Behavior, in POWER37, 51 (SlevenLukesed., 1986). 
24. !d. at 52. 
25.ld. 
26. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1956). 
27 . /d. 
28. Dahl, Power, supra, note 22, at 12. 
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2. The Second Face of Power: Behaviorism with a Twist 
While Dahl made several valuable contributions to the understanding of 
power, he wa; also heavily criticized for his empirical stance, one that required 
an observable causality between the efforts of the powa-ful a:tor and the 
response of the less powa-ful target. Thus, some overt conflict between the 
parties concerning the issue in question wa; . a necessary feature of Dahl's 
approach. Through examinations of such overt conflicts, proponents of this 
view of power claimed to able to discern who typically st£ceeded, and thus to 
observe in which group political power lies . 
Peter Bachrach and Milton Baratz were among the early critics of Dahl. In 
their article, Two Faces of Power/9 they challenge Dahl' s view of power a; 
being too limited, since it deals only with decisions made in the fa:e of 
observable conflict concerning the policy preferences between various elements 
of society. While they agree that st£h decisions surely involve the exercise of 
power they ask: 
[HJ ow can one be cmain m any g1ven situation that the 
' unmeasurable elements' are inconsequential, are not of 
decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a 
sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that 
power is totally embodied and fully reflected in 'concrete 
decisions ' or on activity bearing directly on their making? 30 
Bachrach and Baratz answer their question in the negative. 3 1 They argued 
that not all power issues involve overt conflict between contesting parties. They 
pointed out how the ability to limit which items are open to public discourse, 
the ability to control the agenda, was also an exercise of power. 32 
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making 
of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A 
devotes his energy to creating or reinforcing social and political 
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A 33 
They cite E. E. Schattschneider, who refers to this a; the "mobilization of 
bias. "34 While "Dahl assumed a pluralistic society, in which all the community 
29. Peter Bachrnch& MortonS. Baratz, Two FacesofPower, 56 AM. POL. ~I. REv. 947 ( 1962). 
30. /d. at 948. 
31./d. 
32./d. at 948, n. ll . 
33./d. at 948. 
34 . ld at 949. They quote Schattschneider ~ating" All fonns of !X>Iitical organizatbn have a bias 
in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppressi>n of others because 01gani7ation 
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interests were represented by means of open processes,"35 Bachroch and Baratz 
argue, presaging in some ways Foucault, Bordieu, and others, that the 
institutional structure of a society determines, to a great extent, the nature, 
content, and outcome of public discourse. They claim that a researcher inquiring 
into the nature of power and who wields it must begin by: 
[I]nvestigating the particular ' mobilization of bias' in the 
institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant 
values, the myths and the established political procedures and 
rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which 
persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and 
which, if any, are handicapped by it. 36 
Thus, they expand the definition offered by Dahl and the behaviorists by 
including the unseen structural biases built into a political system by thooe in 
power. The fact that these biases are unseen suggests that rules and norms 
represent a broad-based and democratic exercise of community power when, in 
fact, the range of issues subject to democratic determination ha; been heavily 
circumscribed so as to exclude many issues that the dominant grou}l) do not 
wish to have discussed This structural element of power has many forms and, 
regardless of form, it plays a major role in discussions of power and 
domination. 
3. The Third Face of Power: False Consciousness 
There was a good deal of criticism of Dahl' s approoch, but also of that of 
Bachrach and Baratz' s second face of power. Many commentators thought their 
view to be equally based on cause and effect, albeit on a substantially less 
observable catEe---the absence of a decision. One of those critics, Steven 
Lukes, in his influential book, Power: A Radical View, 31 began a significant 
transformation of the power discourse. Lukes seeks to go beyond the empirical, 
behavioristic approach of Dahl, but he also argues that Bachrach and Baratz' s 
approach, while an improvement over Dahl's, still suffers from a strong 
empirical and behavioral bent that limits its efficacy. 
Lukes attempts to solve this problem by positing a third dimension of power. 
is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are or~nized ott." 
ELMER E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMlSOVEREJGNPEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEM:>CRACY IN 
AMERICA 71 (1960) . 
35. ELISHEVA SA DAN, EMPOWERMENT AND COMMJNilY PLANNING :THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
PEOPI.E·R:>QJSED SOCIAL SOLUTIONS 36 (Richard Fiantz trans., 2004) (e-book) , 
http1/www.mpow.o!Welisbeva_500an_empo·werment.pdf. 
36. Bachrach & Morton, supranote29 ,at 952. 
37 . STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d ed. 2005) (1974). Ltkes published a second 
edit ion in 2005 in which he added t-oo chapters to his originaJ work. It is to the second edition that 
I refer throughout this essay . 
No. 3] The Transposition ofPower 327 
The first dimension tra:ks the overt conflict model put forward by Dahl and 
others while the socond deals with the less observable control of agmdas 
identified by Bachrach and Baratz. Lukes then adds his third dimension, which 
incorporates the descriptions of power found in the first two dimensions but 
goes on to argue that in the third dimension: 
[P]ower may operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in 
a manner contrary to people's interests. In consequence, 
neither revealed preferences [as in the first dimension] nor 
grievances and inchoate demands [as in the second dimension] 
will always express them. 38 
This idea hearkens back to Antonio Gramsci' s notion ofhegemony/ 9 which 
will be discussed more fully later in this soction. The manipulation of "desires 
and beliefs contrary to people's interests" raises the Marxist concept of false 
consciousness, a concept that proves problematic for Lukes in that it requires 
him to identify one' s '''true" interests, which would prevail but for the 
manipulation. 40 
B. De-Facing Power 
A second major problem for Lukes was somewhat surprising, given his 
view of the manipulation of norms. This involves his insistence on the concept 
of human agency as an essential element of power. This is in contrast to a 
structural view of power, which suggests that the dominant norms and practices 
of a society are built in to the very fabric of that society and are a:cepted and 
internalized by the overwhelming majority of its members. Lukes' s requirement 
that power must involve human agency, that is, that it must involve the action or 
inaction of individuals or collectivities, has been contested by many. One of 
these critics, Clarissa Hayward, in her book De-Facing Power, argues for an 
understanding of power "not as an instrument some agents me to alter the 
independent action of others, but rather as a network of boundaries that delimit, 
for all, the field of what is socially possible. "41 Her pooition is that all actors in 
society are limited by these boundaries , although the limitations on some actors 
are far greater than the limitations on others. The mochanisms that comprise 
these boundaries "include laws, norms, standards, and personal and social group 
identities. They demarcate fields of action. " 42 Thus, she argues, thooe who 
critically analyze how agents "enable and constrain" one' s "capacity to help 
38 . ltl at 10. For a comprehensive critique of L\i<es on this point see T. Benton, "Obj ectiw" 
Interests and the SociologyofPower, 15 8)C. 161 (1981). 
39. GRA.Msq supra note 12, at 12. We will see shortly, however, row Gramsci' s VEW was 
considerably different from Lukes' s in seveml ways. 
40. LUKES, supra note 3 7, at 144-45. 
41 . CLARISSA RILE HAYWARD, DE-FACINGPOWER 3 ( 2000). 
42 . /d. atS . 
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shape the tenns of one's life .. . must reject this asswnption that power wears 
the ' face' of agents who use and direct it. "4 3 
While Lukes recognizes the structural aspects of subordination, he resists 
attributing the effects of such structures on subordinated people to an exercise 
of power. He states that "there is a link between power and responsibility: that 
part of the point oflocating power is to fix responsibility for consequences held 
to flow from the action, or indeed inaction, of specifiable agents . " 44 The 
problem with this approach, of course, is tha~ as Hayward points ou~ there are 
many social ills that cannot be attributed to the actions or inactions of any 
person or group. Lukes might respond that these effects are not the results of the 
use of power. This, however, be~ the questions: from what source do they 
result, and in what way can they be addressed?45 
The de-facing of power plays out in several theoretic models. In the next 
sections, I will concentrate on two of them: the structural and the discursive. 
While each of these models provides a theory of power without a fact; they are 
distinct from each other. However, it seems to me that there is an origin that 
they may share. Through the examination of that origin, I hope to bring theories 
of power based on agency, structurt; and discourse closer together and, 
ultimately, to suggest a method of resistance to power and a basis for social 
change. 
1. Beginning with Gramsci 
Antonio Gramsci, borrowing from Marx and Lenin, believed in the concept 
of hegemony. He was particularly interested in the idea of cultural or social 
hegemony by whch subordinated groups (for him, the proletariat) were 
controlled because they accepted and internalized the norms and values of those 
who sought to control them. Grarnsci observed that "social hegemony" is 
accomplished through a two-part process: the "' spontaneous ' consent" given by 
the masses "to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant" 
group (this is based on the internalization of the dominant group's nonns) and 
"[t]he apparatus of state coercive power which ' legally ' enforces discipline on 
those who do not ' consent " -46 As Thomas Bates points out, "[t]he concept of 
hegemony is really a very simple one. It means political leadership based on the 
43 .ld. at 10. 
44. Clarissa Hayward & Steven Lukes, Nobody to Shoot? Power, Stmcture, and Agency. A 
Dialogue, I J. POWER5, 7 (2008)(emphasis in original). 
45 . Hayward describes Lukes' s position conrerning social effects by claiming, 
/d. at 9. 
[S]ome are caused ~ agents who are able to act in ways that predictably and 
significantly affect other agents, while rome are the unplanned net effect of the 
actions of muhiple actors who could rot-not through their individual choices, not 
through their coordinated efforts----oontrol and direct the ottoomes that, together, 
their a:tions prodoce. The former are powerful, because re!ponsible, says L tkes. 
The latter are not. 
46. GRAMSCI, supra note 12, at 12. 
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consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and 
popularization of the world view of the ruling class. "47 
For Gramsc~ the idea of hegemony existed in a sJitere above the economic 
and political structures of a given society. It existed in the realm of ideology, 
and it influenced the institutions of civil society. Bates notes , 
Civil society is compa;ed of all those "private organisrns"-
schools , churches, clubs, journals, and parties- which 
contribute in molecular fashion to the formation of social and 
political consciousness .... The ruling class exEJ"ts its power 
over society on both of these "floors" of oction, but by very 
different methods. Civil society is the marketplace of ideas, 
where intellectuals enter as "salesmen" of contending cultures. 
The intellectuals succeed in creating hegemony to the extent 
that they extend the world view of the rulers to the ruled, and 
thereby secure the "free" consent of the masses to the law and 
order of the land. To the extent that the intellectuals fail to 
create hegemony, the ruling class falls back on the state' s 
coercive apparatus which disciplines those who do not 
"consent," and which is "constructed for all society in 
anticipation of moments of crisis of command . . . when 
spontaneous consensus declines. " 48 
As I mentioned in the earlier discussion of Lukes ' s third dimension of power, 
the influence of Gramsci on Lukes is unmistakable. Nevertheless, the idea of 
hegemony leaves open the question of how it functions in society. As an 
ideological concept, it Cfftainly functions on a much broader level than 
powerful agent A assEJ"ting her authority over subordinate agent B. But how is 
the hegemonic ideology created, and how is it propagated? The main contenders 
in this debate are tha;e who favor an agent-centric explanation of subordination 
(Dahl, Bachroch and Baratz, Lukes , et al.) and tha;e who favor a structural or 
discursive/post-structural one (Gramsci, Hayward, Young, Foucault, et al.). 
2. A Structural Digression 
I begin the discussion of structure in society with an example I have 
previously written about, 49 and which, coincidentally, is one discussed in the 
Hayward and Lukes essay discussed earlier. 50 We see today in the United States 
47 . ThomasR. Bates, Gramsci anti theTheoryofHegemony, 361. HIST. IDEAS 351,352 (1975). 
48 . /d. at 353. 
49. Michael Diamond, De-roncentrating Poverty: De-cons/meting a Theory and the Failure of 
Hope, in COMMUNITY, HOME, & IDEN111Y 47, 47 (MichaelDiamond& Terry Turnipseededs., 2012). 
50. See Hayward& Lukes, supra note44. 
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a widespread pattern of racially segregated housing. 5 1 There are many views 
about why this should be true in the face of significant current federal 
legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination in housing. 5•2 A possible answer 
lies in older federal housing policies frrst formally established in the 1930s. 
In 1933, Congress enacted the Home Owners' Loan Act,53 which created 
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). 54 HOLC was to provide 
government fmds to purchljlSe home mortgages that were in default or otherwise 
in difficulty and to refmance those loans to help homeowners keep their homes. 
Among the explicit policies of HOLC was to refrain from making loans in black 
neighborhoods (or, for that matter, in any mixed-race neighborhood, 
neighborhood of immigrants, or neighborhood of others thought to be racially 
or ethnically problematic). 55 In addition, HOLC steered funds away from 
African-American applicants regardless of their credit-worthiness. These 
policies were explicitly continued by the Federal Housing Administration, 
HOLC's successoragency.56 
Housing policies such as these were exacerbated, directly or indirectly, by 
other explicit federal policies, including: the placement of public housing 
projects on a segregated basis; 57 the Urban Renwal Program, 58 which 
demolished many neighborhoods that were home to low-income black residents 
and caused them to move to other already densely-populated and racially-
segregated neighborhoods; and the Federal Highway program, 59 which had the 
dual effect of increasing the possibility for "white flight" by offering easy 
51. But see Nicoolas 0 . Steohanoooulos. Civil Rir!hts in a Desl!flrl!flafinr< America. 83 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1329, 135&-59 (2016) (arguing tOOt segregation has been decreasing in the United Sates for 
decades, though" no comparable progress is being made" in ot rerareas of discrimination). 
52. In particular, see the Fair HousingActofl968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 360 l-3619(20 12). 
53 . Home Owners' LoanActof 1933, Pub. L. 43-73d, 48 ~at. 128 (1933). 
54. See KENNE1H T . JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA TION OF THE UN nED 
STAlES 195-218(1985). 
55 . See id.; see als:J Diamond, De-amcentrating Poverty: De-constructing a 711eory and the 
Failure ofHope, supra note 49. 
56. For an intere&ing hi&oty of these federal programs, see JACKOON, supra note 54, m 195-218. 
Charles Abrams, a noted political thinker of the time, said, 
A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders 
could have required compliance with a nondiscrimination 
policy .... In&ead, FHA acbpted a racial policy thm cotdd 
\\ell have been culled from the Nuremberg laws. From its 
inceptX>n FHA ~ itself up as tre protector of the all-white 
neighl:x:urood. It sert its agents into the field to keep Negroes 
and other minorities from buying rouses in white 
neighborhoods. 
CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A SruDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 214 ( 1955). 
57 . For a discussion of this policy, ~e Hills v. Gautreaux, in which the Cburt said, 
"Uncontradicted eviden::e submitted to the District Cburt e&ablished that the public housing sy&em 
operated by [Cllicag> Housing Atthority] was racially segregmed, with four overwhehningly white 
projects located in while nei~borlnods and with 99.5%ofthe remaining family units locmed in Negro 
neightxuroods and 99%ofthose tmils occupEd by Negro tenants." Hills v . Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 
287-88(1976). 
58. See Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441- 1490(2012). 
59. Established by Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,Pub. L . No . 84-627,70 Stat. 374( 1956). 
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·access to the newly developed suburbs for whites while also creating significant 
physical barriers, such as multi-lane, high-speed highways, that cut off minority 
neighborhoods from the rest of the city, particularly from white neighborhoods. 
While these policies had come to a formal end by 1970, the effects of the 
policies live on today, almost fifty years later. In fact, one could easily argue 
(although it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so) that although the homing 
policies put in place beginning in the 1930s by the federal government were 
reinforcing rather than establishing social norms, it is fairly certain that such 
policies institutionalized discriminatory practices on a national basis. Further, 
even if one could assmne that the people who envisioned, created, and 
implemented these early policies were power-wielding agents in a Lukesian 
sens~ it is highly unlikely that those who left the city for the submoo in 1974 
were such agents . This is true despite the fact that white flight exocerbated 
segregation and the poverty rate in the cities the movers left behind. Those 
cities were increasingly populated by low-income minorities and were hard-
pressed to provide the funds necessary to meet the increased demands for 
government services while simultaneously dealing with a diminished tax base. 
Hayward characterizes this issue by saying, 
Most people would hold a discriminating landlord morally 
responsible for the adverse effects of her actions on the homing 
choices of others, but most would not hold responsible for her 
unintended role in producing such effects someone who moves 
her family out of a city in order to live in its suburbs. 60 
So, if there are not any people or grou~ to whom one could ascribe 
responsibility for the homing plight of poor people of color, if there are none 
who can be said to have caused this effect, should power no longer be 
considered an element of the resulting situation? The structuralists and poot-
structuralists each have a response. 61 
3. A Structural View : Social Relations as Conduits 
Social order involves a series of relationships that have been built into, have 
been created by, and have endured within a society.62 According to structural 
theorists, these relationships have embedded within them a series of norm; that 
60. Hayward & Ltikes, supra oote 44, at 10 (empffisis in original). See al:D infra pp. 339-40 and 
note 112. 
61. There are differences and similarities in the!E models of critiques. Structtralism is based 
primarily on language and linguisti:s while po!Htructumlism is based on knowledge ~&terns that, of 
course, are transmitted through language. My g>al here is not to delve deeply into the epi&temology of 
these theories btt to discuss in rather broad litrokes !Dme oft he thinking of those deoominated as of one 
or the other of the schools ofthought. 
62 . See, e.g. , Mn...L& s.~pra note 26, at4 (arguing that there is a lx>dy of people who, due to their 
non-representative positions in industry, finance, the militruy, etc., are able to make decisions "having 
major co nsequen:es" ). 
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order inter~tions between participants in any relationship. These norms largely 
regulate how the parties in the relationship will behave toward one another. 
They also take us beyond the "power over" analyses of the behaviorists and 
include a "power to" component that is thought by many commentators to be 
both the lubricant that allows society to function, as well as the catalyst for the 
creative expansion of the public good. 63 
In examining how structure works in society, Jeffrey Isaac hm analogized 
viewing social structure to the way scientists study the properties of various 
elements in nature, for instance the conductivity of copper: 
In the realist [structuralist] view, social science would be 
similarly concerned with the construction of models of the 
social world and its lawful structure. The primary object of 
theoretical analysis would not be behavioral regularities [as 
were, according to Isaac, of the power-related studies of Dahl, 
Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes], but the enduring social 
relationships that structure them. 64 
This does not mean that social relations are completely reified. In f~t, 
many structuralists, led by Anthony Giddens, believe in a "duality of 
structure. '.o6s Giddens explains that: 
We should not conceive of the structures of domination built 
into social institutions as in some way grinding our "docile 
bodies" who behave like the automata suggested by objectivist 
social science. Power within social systems . . . presumes 
regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between 
actors or collectivities in contexts of social interactions. 66 
Isaac expands on this view by saying, 
The major point of this approach is that purpooive human 
activity has social preconditions, which are relatively enduring 
relations (e.g., husband/wife, capitalist/worker, 
citizen/representative) that constitute the complexity of any 
given society. Individuals and groups participate within these 
63 . See, e.g., Matk Haugaard, Reflections on Seven Ways of Creating Power, 6 EUR. J. SX. 
THEORY 87, 89 (2003). 
64. Jeffrey C. Isaa:, Beyvnd the 77zree Faces of Power: A Realist Critique, 20 POLITI 4, 18 
(1987). 
65. ANlHONY GIDDENS, NEW RULES OF SOCOLOGICAL MElHOD 121 (1976). I should mention 
here that Giddens has a l9) been asS>cmed with the discursive, po~-&ructurali~ school, and we shall 
return to a discussion of Giddens later in this in section. 
66 . ANTIIONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTilUTIONOF ~CIElY 16 (Polity Press 1984). 
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conditions, reproducing and transforming them in the course of 
their ordinary lives. 67 
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Isaoc provides an example of the structural aspects of a social 
relationship-that between teachers and students. He maintains that the essence 
of this relationship is not one between "two parties who happen to engage in 
interaction. " 68 It is, instead, "an historically enduring" one that both creates 
well-defined roles between the participants in any such relationship but also 
create; a mutual interdependence.69 Each party to such a relationship poosesses 
certain "powers" that are inherent in the structure of student-teacher 
relationships . 70 Isaac distinguishes these structural allocations of power from 
the behavioristic cause and effect analyses of Dahl, Bachra:h and Baratz, and 
Lukes, et al., in that the student-teacher interactions are part of the very 
relationship and are distinct from the "regularities" of expected behavior that 
derive from an individual agent exerting power over an individual subject. 7 1 
Within a structural relationship, each party may depart, intentionally or 
unintentionally, from his or her structured role; a teacher might miss a class or a 
student might fail to study or be unruly. This, according to Isaoc, does not 
change the powers assigned to the particular role, although the regular existence 
of such deviations might make one a poor teacher or a bad student "The 
possession of these powers in the performance of social activities is necessary 
to these activities , but the successful exercise of these powers is contingent "72 
Isaac goes on to "define social power as the capacities to act possessed by 
social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate. ,m 
This is an example of Giddens's duality of structure, the structure establishing 
the broad parameters of a relationship (the structure) and the ability of 
participants within that relationship to engage in a range of activity (the agency) 
that may confrrm the structure or reject or modify it. The structure, not the acts 
of the teacher, for the most part, cause the student to act a; he or she does and 
vice-versa Because there is room, even within structured relationships, for the 
contingencies of human agency, structures are not immutable. They may 
change, and, in fact, power relationships may be reversed I will return to this 
thought in Section IV, infra. 
67 . Isaac, supra note 64, at 19 (emphasis added). 
68 . ld. at 22. 
69. ld. 
70 . ld. 
7 l.ld. at 22. 
72 . ld. 
73 . /d. (emphasis in the original). 
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4. Discipline and the Panopticon: A Discursive, Post-Structuralist View 
"A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. " 
-Michel Foucault 74 
Prior to 1he eighteenth century, discipline was exercised by the sovereign 
upon the body of the subject By the eighteenth century, however, a change in 
the nature of discipline was emerging such that Jeremy Bentham, in the late 
1780s, had begun developing his idea of the Panopticon 75 The Panopticon was 
a device intended to create a more effective and less expensive form of prison. 
It was to consist of a circular outer rim, which was divided into prison cells, the 
fronts of which could be seen through At the center of the outer rim was a 
guard tower with windows devised so that the guards had a 360-degree view of 
the cells but the prisoners could not see in. Thu:;, while all prisoners could 
always potentially be observed, the prisoners were not able to observe the 
guards or ascertain whether they, the prisoners, were being observed by the 
guards at any particular time. 
As with any prison, there were certain rules of conduct for those who were 
incarcerated. Violations of these rules would result in some form of discipline. 
Because the prisoners were subject to constant observation, the fear of that 
discipline led them to conform their conduct to the requirements of the prison 
rules . Since they did not know whether, in foc~ they were being oooerved at any 
particular time, 1hey conformed their conduct all the time. Thu:;, they were, 
effectively, self-disciplining. 
Michel Foucault extrapolated from Bentham' s original conception and applied 
the notion of 1he Panopticon, 76 metaphorically, to other major elements of 
modern society such as 1he schoo~ the workplace, and the hospital. He argued 
that the redoction in corporal discipline that took place during the 18th century 
was replaced by disciplining the "soul" of the object of the discipline. 77 Thu:;, 
the rules of behavior associated with these and other societal institutions and 
activities were internalized by those who were subject to the rules.78 The rules 
became part of their everyday life, became pll"t of the fabric of the society in 
which they functioned.79 These systems of behavior were constructions of the 
society and, as they became internalized, were called epistemes by Foucault 80 
7 4 . Michel Foucault, The Subjed and Power. 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 791 ( 1982). 
75 . JEREMY BENTIIAM, THE PANOPTICONWRITINGS (Miran Bozoviced., 1995). 
76. For Foocault's description of the Pamptiron, fl!e MIGIEL FoUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISH 200- 02 (Alan Sheridantrnns., Random House 1977). 
77 . Id at 16 ('The expiati:>n that once rained down upon the Indy must be rep~ced by a 
punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.') 
78. /d. at 202. 
19. /d. 
80. MARK 0LSSEN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: MATERIALISM AND EDUCATION (1999), explains 
epistemes by saying that Arcl1aeology (a term Foucault used to describe a JTElhod of his research) 
describes" rules that mdergird ways of looking at the world. These rules are regulariles t hat determine 
the systems of possibility as to what is oonsidered as true and false, and they detennine wha ooums as 
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These were the regularities of understanding and behavior that allowed for both 
domination and productive cooperation in society. The epistemes play a major 
role in Foucault's view of power, which differs markedly from that of the 
behaviorists and, to some exten~ from that of the structuralists. For Foucault 
and others there is a dynamic relationship between power and knowledge, 
although Foucault went beyond many of the others in his analysis , 
(I]n a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there 
are manifold relations of power which permeat~ charocterise 
[sic] and constitute the social body, and these relations of 
power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, occumulation, circulation 
and functioning of a discourse. 8 1 
Foucault distinguishes the power of the sovereign of several centuries ago 
with the disciplinary power which he argues operates today. His view of power 
is highly decentralized and functions in all the techniques and apparatuses of 
everyday life (through the episternes). Thus, the study of power should, 
according to Foucault, focus not on the centralized " legitimate" (meaning law 
and sovereignty) forms of power, but on "power at its extremities, in its ultimate 
destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary." 8 2 He is more 
interested in how power a:ts on the people who are subjected to its effects than 
on the formal statement of rules . Thus, Foucault is interested in trying "to 
discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and 
materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces , energies, 
materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grmp subjection in its 
material instance as a constitution of subjects. " 83 
This hearkens back to my earlier comments about Hayward and her "network 
of boundaries"84 and lsaa: 's "enduring relations"85 in that Foucault believes 
that power is not pa;sessed by anyone but rather circulates and is "employed 
and exercised through a net-like organization. " 86 Power creates the subject and, 
in tum, uses the subject to propagate power. Thus, power is a function of bodies 
of "knowledge," which are constructed "truths," that are created through 
grounds for assent or dissent, as well as what argtlllents and data are relevant and legitimate. These 
' structures of thought' are temted epistemes. An ' episteme' refers to 'the total set of relations that unite, 
at a given period, the discursive proctices .... The epistente is not a form ofkrowledge ... or type of 
rationality ... it is the totality of relations that can be discovered for a given perl>d, between the 
sciences when one analyzes them at the level of discursive regularities." I d at I 0-- 11. 
81 . Michel Foucaul , Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWlEDGE: SEI.ECTID IN1ERVIEWS AND OlHER 
WRITINGS 1972-1977 78, 93 (Colin Gordoned., ColinGordonet a!. trans., Random House 1980). 
82 ./d. at 96. 
83 . /d. at 97. 
84. See text acoompanyingnote 41- 43. 
85 . See text acoompanyingnotes 68-71. 
86. Foucault, 1\vo Lectures, supra note 81, at 98. 
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science and social interaction and then are reproduced by people acting on the 
basis of these social constructions. 87 
Others have devised similar views of social construction. One, Pierre 
Bourdieu, has developed a concept of habitus that has many similarities with 
Foucault' s epistemes. In the editor's note to Bourdieu' s Language and Symbolic 
Power, John B. Thomson defmes habitus as, "a set of dispositions which incline 
agents to act in certain ways . The dispooitions generate practices, perceptions 
and attitudes which are 'regular' without being consciously co-ordinated or 
governed by any ' rule.' The dispositions which constitute the habitus are 
inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable. " 88 
Bourdieu himself describes the habitus as, "[t]he structures constitutive of a 
particular type of environment (e.g the material conditions of existence 
characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions, structured structures predispooed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of 
practices and representations ."89 
The habitus, therefore, is generated by long-standing social interaction and 
becomes the way that individuals (or groups) understand the world, and by 
acting in accordance with that understanding, they reproduce and extend it. 
Thus, even groups disadvantaged by one or more social practices may accept 
the disadvantage because it is in accord with their view of how the world and 
social interaction works . 
Neither Foucault nor Bourdieu think that epistemes or habitus must be the 
result of some conscious effort by the powerful Each believes that individual 
interactions create a power relationship that, through repeated interactions 
between the original parties and with others, becomes generally recognized and 
internalized. I will have more to say about this in Section IV, infra. 
The fmal commentator on power that I will address in this section is one 
mentioned earlier, Anthony Giddens. 90 Giddens 's "duality of structure" 
straddles the behaviorist and structuralist/post-structuralist thinking about 
power. He developed a theory of structuration that involves both societal 
structures (which would include epistemes and habitus), but also includes 
significant room for agency. Structuration theory involves the structuring of 
human relations acroos time and space. 9 1 It involves the creation and 
reprodoction of norms and practices that make social life possible. The 
predictability that is produced by strt£turation allows people to act in concert to 
87. Neither Foucault nor the other po& -ltrocttrali& theori&s eliminate the possibility of resi&an:e 
to the societal constmctions. I will develop this t bought further in this and subsequent sections. 
88 . PIERREBOURDIEU, LANGUAGE ANDSYMBOLIC POWER 12(1981). 
89 . P IERRE BOURDIEU, OUlLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 72 (Erne& Gellner et al eds., 
Richard Nic:e trans., 1977) (footnote omitted). Bourdieu defines " dispositl>n" as '\he result of m1 
organizing action ," which he likens to a word such as " &ncture." hl at nl . " fllt also designates a 
way of being, a habitual state ... and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency. propensity. or 
inclination." !d. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
91. See GIDDENS, THE CONSTill.JTION OF SOC! ElY , supra note 66,at 3 76. 
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accomplish things they would not have been able to accomplish by acting 
separately. 92 
Giddens distinguishes between structures and systems. Structures are 
ephemeral and exist only at the moment in time in which a particular interaction 
takes place. They are based upon the actors' understanding of the meaning, the 
appropriate behavior, under particular circumstances. This is the element of 
structuration. But, as Haugaard points out, 
[T]he reproduction of meaning is not a personal affair . 
While it is true that the reproduction of structure presuppa;es 
structuration by an actor A, it also presuppooes the recognition 
of that action as ordered, or meaningful, by an actor B 
(structuration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
reproduction of social structure). 93 
Thus, for the structure to be reproduced, there needs to be an act of 
"confirm-structuration" to the original act of structuration. Haugaard uses as an 
example of this actor A offering a five-Euro note in exchange for an object. 
Actor A is offering to reproduce a structure, the value of the note being in 
excess of its value merely as a piece of paper, but the reproduction is not 
complete until actor B confirm-structures by taking the note for the object 94 
Thus, while there is a generally recognized structure in society (in Haugaard' s 
example, the value of a five-Euro note), that structure is not reproduced unless a 
second actor confirms the structure This leaves room for individual agency to 
interact with structures, which allows tha;e structures to be modified or even 
nullified. Of course, for a modification or nullification to take effect, the de-
structuration must occur across numbers of people and over time; it does not 
occur through a single, or even a number of isolated incidents. 
For a structure to have the predictability that society requires to maintain 
order, both actor A and actor B need to have knowledge of the structure. 95 For 
Giddens, an actor's knowledge is broken down into two parts: practical 
consciousness knowledge and discursive consciousness knowledge. 96 Proctical 
consciousness knowledge is that knowledge that is internalized and accepted 
without critical assessment.97 This harkens back to Gramsci's hegemony and, 
perhaps, to Lukes' s false consciousness. Discursive consciousness knowledge is 
92 . " [A] s:>ciety gives actors a capacity to do things which trey could not otherwise acoompli!tl if 
they were not members of society ." Haugaard, supra note 63, at 8 9. 
93 . It/. at 90 . 
94. /d. at 91 - 92. 
95 . " ITlhe creatbn of power through the reproductbn of social order in general prestpposesa 
consensus tpon the recreation of meaning which is realized through &ructuring and confirm-&ru:turing 
practices." Haugaard, supra note 63, at 93. 
96. /d. at 100. 
97. Pra:tical oonscbusness knowledge is " [wJhat actors krow (believe) atxHt social conditions, 
including e~ecially the condition oftreirown actbn, but cannot express discursively." GIDDENS, THE 
CONS111U110N OF SOCIElY, supranote66,at 375. 
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that knowledge which is brought into discursive focus and which is able to be 
critically evaluated. 98 The confirming structuration that Haugaard believes f:; 
required for the reproduction of a structure is usually the reflexive response 
provided by one's proctical consciousness knowledge. However, octor B also 
has the option of destructuring an offered structuration, which, if widely 
repeated, would create instability in the social system The destructuration 
would be the result of octor B bringing into discursive focus the structuration 
offered by A 
By virtue of this brief sojourn through the vast and varied modern literature 
on power, one sees the complexity of establishing a working definition of 
power. It is at least as complex as attempting to apply such a definition in a real 
world struggle against subordination and powerlessness. Yet that is the task 
activists have set for themselves in their struggle against such societal ills. In 
the next soction, I will lay the framework of the societal subordination that 
oppresses the poor and people of color in today ' s United States. 
Ill. RACE AND SUBORDINATION IN AMERICA 
America' s history of racial discrimination and the subordination of blacks 
goes bock to the early colonies and ha:; gone through several iterations over the 
centuries, including, even in modem times, the use of physical violence. The 
oppression runs from slavery, through Jim Crow laws, to voting restrictions, 
associational restrictions (including the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson),99 and to restrictive covenants and explicitly legalized governmental 
discrimination in mortgage lending (both of which led to massive segregation of 
housing and lower homeowners hip rates among blacks). 100 
For much of our history, politicians, commentators, and many people in 
society have blamed the poor, particularly poor people of color, for their own 
situation. Because of this belief, there appeared a variety of pejoratives used 
publically to describe and dispar.age the poor. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, we distinguished between those who were poor due to 
conditions beyond their control and all other poor people. The former group 
included infants, the elderly, and the sick or disabled, who were said to be the 
"deserving" poor. The others were said to be lazy, unambitious, drunkards , or 
criminals and were designated as the undeserving poor and largely cut off from 
public compa:~sion and from assistance. 10 1 More recently, disparaging tenns 
98 . Discursive cons:;ioumess knowledge is " [w]hat actors are able to say, or give verool 
expression to , alx>ut SJcial conditX>ns, including especially the conditions of their own act ion; 
awareness which has a discursive form ." /d. at3 74. 
99. Plessy v . Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
100. See, e.g. , JACKs::>N, supra note 54, at 195-218. 
I 01 . For an intere!ting hi!torical view of di!tinguishing and labeling the poor, see HERBERT J. 
GANS, THE WAR AGAINST lHE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIP0\£RlY POLICY 11- 26 ( 1995). 
See also MIOIAEL B. KA 1Z, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ONPOVERlY TO THE WA RON 
WELFARE(l989). 
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such as the "culture of poverty" and the "underclass" have been u;ed to describe 
poor people, but tended to be particularly identified with urban African-
Americans. 102 
This history undawent a symbolic change 103 with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 104 Ten years after Brown, Coogress 
passed the Civil Rights Act, 105 followed by the Voting Rights Act the next 
year, 106 and then the Fair Housing Act in 1968.107 These statutory deviatbns 
from existing discriminatory norms and rules occompanied the "War on 
Poverty"108 as the federal government took largely unprecedented oction to 
combat. the existence and effocts of legalized discrimination. Many state laws 
followed these efforts. 109 They sought to curb much of the overt discrimination 
seen in the public sphere. With the advent of the War on Poverty and the Great 
Society, one might have thought that the era of discrimination had ended. It had 
not! 110 
Putting a;ide the current legal retrenchment (both legislative and judicial) 
on federal and state anti-discrimination law,111 American society today remails 
102 . The term, " Ute mderclass," !larted as an academic roncept but was tmn&ormed into a 
popular and pejorative label for urban African-Americans. GANS,supra note 101, at 27. The !OCi>logi~ 
Gunnar Myrdal roined the term " under-class" to "describe the victims of deindustriali:zati>n." /d. 
However, the tem1 went through a definitional transformation when the August29, 1977 issue ofT ime 
magazine did a cover ~ory entitled Tile American Undercloss: Destitute and Desperate in /he Land of 
Plenty. The article described, in particularly negative terms, the personal attribttes of poor, urban, 
Afri:an-Americans. The American Underclass: Destitute and De~erate in d1e Land of Plenty, Tll\IE, 
Aug. 29, 1977. T lrus, the term entered the popular consciousness as a pejorative label for poor blacks. 
103. Even Ronald Reagan formally re-established the public use of offensive designations when he 
used the term "welfare queen" in his 1976 presidential campaign See "Welfare Queen " Becomes !s!lle 
in Reagan Campai[!.n, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976. 
104. Brown v . Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). While iliere \vere rourt cases pri>r to Brown 
outlawing rertain types of discrimination, Brown is generally thought to have initated Ole modem era 
concerning the legal contotus of race relations in the United States. 
105. Civil Ri!tJts Act of 1964, Pub. L . No. 88-352, 78 ~at. 241 (1964) (rodified as 3Illendedin 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
106. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat . 437 (1 %5) (rodified as amended in 
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.) . 
107 . Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 9()-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (rodified as an"ended at42 U.S.C 
§§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2012)). 
108. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Stale of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964 ): 
http J lwww. presidency. ocsb. edu/wsnpid=26787 . 
109. See, e.g., D.C. Htman Ri!tJts Act of 1977, D.C CODE§ 2- 1402.01 et seq. (2017); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW §296(McKinney 2016). 
110. For a discussion of the current di!parity in the distributi>n of various societal benefits, s;e 
Kimberle Williams Crens1aw, Twenty Years of Critical Race 111eory Looking Back to lvbve Fomard, 
41 CONN. L.REV. 1253, 1336-47 (20ll). 
111. See, .for example, Shelby County, Al. v. Holder, 133 S. Q . 2612 (2013)(invalidating portions 
of the Voting Rights Act). The Brennan <:enter for Justice at New York University noted after the 
decision l hat: 
Starting after Ole 20 10 election, legislators in ready half Ole states passed a wave 
of laws making it harder to vole. These new re~ri:lions ranged from ctts to ear tv 
voting to burdens on voter registrati>n to strict voter ID requirentents. While 
courts ~eooed in before the 2012 election to block manv of these laws. Ole 
Supreme Court 's 2013 decision in Shelby 0Jw1(Y gutting the mo!i po\\erful 
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highly divided along racial lines . The number of black Americans in poverty, in 
prison, unable to fmd a job, or under-employed is severely disproportionate to 
their numbers in the population as a whole.11 2 Why is this the case? Some of it 
is undoubtedly the result of personal racial animus among some people. Much 
of it, however, is not. Much of it is the unintended and, perhaps, undesired 
result of social structures and embedded norm:; that exis~ and have existed, in 
the country since long before the Civil Rights Era of the mid-to-late twentieth 
century. To paraphrase Iris Marion Young, it is p~ible for a person to suffer 
societal harm without any social agent she ha; encountered to having done her 
any specific wrong. 113 
To explain this claim, Young uses as an example a single mother, Sandy, who 
lives with her two children in a central city apartment building, which is being 
converted into a condominium by its owner. 114 Sandy has a low-wage job that 
requires an arduous commute on public transportation. She is willing to move 
and seeks an apartment closer to her job. After a diligent search, she finds only 
a few available units, and thooe are quite expensive. More affordable units are 
on the other side of town Sandy then devotes some of the money she intended 
to use for housing to buying a car to ea;e her commute. She applies for a 
housing subsidy but is told there is a two-year wait. After continuing her search, 
Sandy settles for a small one-bedroom apartment (the children would use the 
bedroom and she would use a fold-out bed in the living room) that is a 45-
minute drive from her job-unless traffic is bad Her fmal hurdle is coming up 
with the standard three-month deposit for the unit. That is difficult since she 
used moot of her savings for the down payment for the car. If she cannot obtain 
the depooit, Sandy and her family face the proopoct of homelessness . Young 
posits throughout her example the absence of moral wrong by any of the agents 
Sandy has encountered. 115 Young then says, 
It is plausible ... to find that Sandy suffers injustices but that 
no particular agent she encounters has done her a spocific 
wrong. Nor can the wrong that Sandy suffers be attributed to 
some particular unjust law or policy that ha; kept her and others 
like her from having a nome. 116 
protections of the Voting Ri!Pts Act made it even easier for &ales to put in place 
restrictivevoting laws. 
Election 2016: Restrictive VolingLawsbytlleNumbers('f:£pt. 28, 2016), 
httos://www. brennancenter.orwanalv sis/election-20 16-re&rict ivf)ovot in g-laws-numbers. The article 
goes on to provide aninteroctive chart oft he various laws with the effex:t of limiting voting. !d. 
112. See generally O'FtAHERlY, supro rote 4 (discussing the S.atiS.ics and economi::s of tre 
positionofminoritiesin the United States). 
113. IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILI1YFORJUSTICE47 (2011) . 
114. /d. 
115 . /d. at 4 3-44, 46 
116. ld.at47. 
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Rather, Sandy's injuries are the re;ult of a series of unintentional, 
uncoordinated, and, presumooly, morally blameless a;tions by multitudes of 
people prior to the time she confronts her crisis. 11 7 These actions that resulted, 
for ex~mple, in a lack of affordable housing, lack of effective public transit, and 
absence of living-wage jobs for women without higher education or technical 
skills, were part of a set of societal norms and practices that could be likened to 
Gramsci's hegemony, Foucault's episternes, and Bourdieu's habitus. In other 
words, they are the result of societal structures and norms that are embedded 
and taken for granted by the overwhelming majority of people. They have 
become, in Giddens's terms, part of the practical consciousness knowledge of 
the society. 
IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE PROGRESS OF POWER 
"Never doubt that a small f!rouo ofthouflhtfitl. committed citizens can change 
the world. Indeed, it 's the only thing that ever has." - Margaret Mead 118 
It has long been an axiom of political resistance that oppressed people need 
to organize into purposive groups to achieve their goals .119 But even organized 
group; are often isolated and look only to achieve their own short-term goals 
regardless of their long-term needs. It is often the case in these situations, 
however, that when a particular goal is achieved (or even when it is not), the 
group dis bands, leaving other grievances unaddressed Social movements 
purport to be different Many commentators have distinguished social 
movements from pressure group; , lobbying group; , and general community 
group;. But social movements themselves have been defined by commentators 
in various ways. Nevertheless, there is a coalescing of views around several 
important points in essentially all defmitions of social movements. 120 
Courpasson and Dany, paraphrasing Zald and Berger, say social movements are 
social realizations "through which collective challenges are held together by a 
117. /d. 
118 . Margaret Mead, THEY ALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (Fred R. ~apiro ed. , 2006) (q.ote 
attributed by Rushworth M. Kidder, Every Tourist a Diplomat, CHRISTIAN ~1. MoNITOR (Jure 1, 
1989)). 
119. See, e.g , ALEXJS DETOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. II, Book 2, 114 (Alfied 
A. Kropf 1945) ('If ea::h citizen did not learn, in proportion as he individually becomes more feeble 
and consequently more incapable of preserving his freedom single-handed, to combine with his fellow 
citizens for the purpose of defending it , it is clear that tyrnnny \IDuld unavoidably increase."). See also 
MaiVin E. Olsen, Sociopolitical Plurali::m, ill POWER IN MoDERN SOCIETIES, 146, 147 (Marvin E. 
Olsen & Martin N. Marger eds., 1993) ('As elaborated by mmerous contemporruy writers, tre theory 
of sociopolitical pluralism calls for a complex network of intere!t organizations through>ut society, 
each of which possesses its own power base and hence can function rel.:1lively independently of the 
government."). 
120. DAVIS A. SNOW ET AL., THE BLACKWELL COMPANION 10 SOCIAL MoVEMENTS, 6 (2007) 
('Although the various definitions of Iroverrents may differ in terms of what is emphasized or 
accented, most are based on three or more of the following axes: collective or joint action; change-
oriented goals or claims; s:>me extra- [sic] or non-institttional collective oction; some degree of 
organization; and some degree of tempornl continuity ."). 
·-
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sense of common purpa:;e, [sic] solidarity, acra:;s time and space by relative ly 
resilient organizational forms of contestation. "12 1 Sarat and Scheingold quote 
Charles Tilly, who defines social movements as : 
[A] sustained series of interactions between power holders and 
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a 
constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of 
which those persons make publicly visible demands for 
changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back lhose 
demands with public demonstrations of sup port. 122 
The sense of sustained organizations and contestation are the common 
elements in most defmitions of social movements. One must ask then 
whether-and if so, l;low- asocial movement can make significant inroads into 
the issue of poverty and the economic and social oppression of poor people of 
color. A secondary question, but one of some importance, is: how do the law 
and lawyers fit into social movements and social change? 
As I said earlier, the poor, part£ularly poor people of color, suffer from a 
power deficit. Given the wide-ranging defmitions of power that have been 
advanced, the meaning of "power deficit" may need further elaboration. In the 
context of individual or group agents, subjects and objects of power, the 
meaning is fairly clear. One party has more resources, be they capital, skills, 
contacts, or organization, which can be deployed to defeat the wishes of the 
other party. In such cases, the mobilization of the objects of power has a 
specific target to combat The problem is much more complicated when there is 
no "powerful" agent imposing its will on others but oppression stems from the 
ordinary operation of the social and economic institutions of the society. 
1. Mobilization as a Prelude to Power 
When fighting an ohiervable enemy, mobilization has a target, and 
strategies can be devised that are thought to be ma:;t effective in defeating that 
enemy and accomplishing that particular combatant's goals. If the goals are 
finite and their achievement is discernible, there is a significant risk that the 
mobilization will either dissipate once its goals are met or, to channel Karl 
Marx 123 and Robert Michels, 124 become the bureaucratic antithesis of its 
121. David Cowpamn and Fram;oise Dany, Cu!JuresoJResislance in d1e Workplace, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOKOFPOWER,332(StewartR. Clegg& Mark Haugaardeds., 2009). 
122. AUSTIN SARAT & STuART A. SCHEINGOLD, What Cause Lawy ers Do For and To Social 
Movements: An lntrrxiuction, in CAUSE LAWYERSAND ~CIAL MOVEMENTS, 1, 2 (Sarat & Scheingold 
eels., 2006) (quoting Charles Tilly, Social Movemen ts and National Politics, in SrA lEMA KING AND 
~CIAL MOVEMENTS 305, 306 (Charles Bright & &!san Hardings eds., 1984 )). One shotdd note here 
that this definitbn is neltrnl as to the pwpose of the movement. It applies as much to the Tea Party 
Movernert as it does to the Feminist or Civil Rights Movement. 
123. See generally KARL MARx, CAPITAL (Penguin Classics 1992)( 1867). 
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original purpose. When fighting an unknown enemy, the nature of the struggle 
and the nocessary mobilization is quite different from the classic battle against a 
known opponent. 
This calls into question the validity of the statement attributed to Margaret 
Mead that begins this soction. Can a small group of individuals "change the 
world?" If it is the case that oppression arises from the impersonal norms and 
structures of society, the strategy to combat the oppression needs to address 
those norms and structures and not, typically, particular individuals or groups. 
To construct such a strategy, a movement, in order to act appropriately, needs to 
understand the nature of the power it confronts . Thu:;, structuralist and post-
structuralist ideas of power are central to this discussion. 
Recall that essentially every commentator aligned with these theoretical 
models placed an ymphasis on the knowledge that circulates within a 
social/political grouping. While there might once have been a person or group 
who originally formulated, in a more or less positivist manner, a particular rule 
or policy, over time many of those rules or policies became embedded in the 
way society ft11ctions. They bocome part of society's a;)Cepted pr~:Ctices . There 
no longer would be an identifiable provenance or lineage of these pr~:Ctices but 
they bocame so widely a;)Cepted that they have bocome part of the epistemes 
(Foucault), habitus (Bourdieu), or practical consciousness knowledge (Giddens) 
of the society. Or, to put it another way, they bocame part of the entangled web 
of day-to-day existence. In order to change those embedded pra;)tices, one 
would have to change the knowledge base of the society. To me Giddens's 
terms, pr~:Ctical consciousness knowledge would have to be converted to 
discursive consciousness knowledge, so that a Habermasean dialogue, a rational 
discourse, would ensue. 
While there have been several examples of such transformations in modem 
America (the Women 's Movement and the Freedom to Marry Movement come 
to mind, 125 along with the Civil Rights Movement), there has also been a 
backlash to many of the proposed and octual changes to social norms and 
attitudes that have been inspired by these movements. Consider in this regard 
the renaissance of rocially targeted speech and oction that has returned to the 
surface during the 2016 Presidential campaign. 126 
In order to achieve their goals, e~:Ch successful movement was able to create 
discourse in the society concerning the way people thought about the 
movement's central issues. Over the past half century, we have seen such a 
discourses emerge concerning the role of women, the rights of same sex 
124. See J?enera//y ROBERT MIOIELS. POLI11CAL PARTIES: A 8:>COLOGICAL STuDY OF 1HE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIESOFMoOERNDEM::>CRACY(l962). 
125 . This movement achieved i'.s mo!t sill!lifi:ant oublic vidoiV with the Suoren1e Com's 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Q . 2584 (2015), which made same-sex marriage a 
Con!tittti>nal riglt . For a discussion of the strategy leading to this decisi>n. see Freedom to Marry, 
ht tpJ/www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-hap!X!ned (last visited on May 28, 20 17). 
126 . See Susan Milligan, This Race Is About Race, U.S. NEWs& WORLD REP . (Sept. 2, 2016), 
http J/www.usnews.co m/news/articles/20 16-09-02/ra::ial-tensio n-in-th~ 20 16-presidential-election. 
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couples, and the removal of many of the legal and social barriers to societal 
participation by African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities . 
However, as can be seen by the continued discrimination against these grou(X) , 
the transformation is far from complete. In fact, what is occmring is a spate of 
counter-movements seeking to re-establish the former hegemonic principles of 
the society. 
The result of these competing movements has been the creation of a more 
open public debate on some of the issues that have been raised This debate has 
begun to raise the level of discourse from practical consciousness to a more 
discursive consciousness. I say "hac; begun to" because of a sense that the 
positions taken by some participants in the various debates remain mired in 
practical consciousness knowledge. That is, their positions are instinctual, based 
on embedded beliefs, rather than on a Habermasean reasoned discourse. 127 
Thus, the question is "what is to be done?" 
2. Mobilization for Change: The Role of the Law and of Lawyers 
Shakespeare once wrote, 'The first thing we do, let's kill all the 
lawyers." 128 This is a somewhat extreme solution to a problem that some 
perceive in relation to the role of lawyers in social movements. Nevertheless, 
the perception of what has been done in social movements often tracks very 
closely to a narrative of a:tivist lawyers rning the law to a:hieve social change. 
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, and up to the present time, 
law and lawyers have been considered by many to have been an integral part of 
social movements and of social change They believe that a good deal of the 
changes a:hieved by movements came about by virtue of litigation, especially 
Supreme Court litigation, 129 and aggressive lobbying for changes in state and 
federal statutory law. 130 In addition to popular views on the subject, there was a 
significant amount of scholarly literature supporting this assessment of the role 
127. For an explanationofHabermas'sviewof rational discourse; see SrANR:>RD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOOOPHY § 3.2. lttos://olato.stanford.edutentries/habemuts/#HabDiSfhe. (la!t visited M:tV 28. 
2017) ('Habermas's tbe01y of communicative action rests on tl'£ idea that social order ultimately 
depends on the caoacitv of actors to recol!l1ize the ittersubiective validitv of the different claims on 
which 9JCial oooperation depends. In conceiving coopernt.ion in relation to validity claims, Haberrnas 
highliehts its rational and cognitive chamcter: to recognize the validity of such claims is to oreStme that 
good reasons could be given to justify them in the face of critici sm. TCA thus points to and depends on 
an account of su:h imtifJCation-that is. on a theory of argumentation or discourse; which HabemH:ls 
calls the ' reflective form ' of communicative action."). 
128. WILLIAM SiAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PARTOFKINGHENRY lHESlxm act4, sc. 2. 
129. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Q . 2584 (2015); Goldberg v. Kelley , 397 U.S. 254 
(1970) (applying due process riglts to public assistan:e recipients when the g>vemment seeks to 
terminate theirbenefits); Brownv .Bd. ofEduc., 347U.S. 483 (1954). 
130. For examplesoffederallegislation, see notes 104--07 and acoompmying text. For examp£s 
of !tate legislltive initiatives, see Affimzative Action/Overview, NAT. CONF. OF Sr. LEGLSLA lURES 
(Feb. 7, 20 14), http://www. ncsl.orgtreseaJCh/education/affinnat ive-act bn-<>verview.a!px (discussing 
various affirmative action poli;:ies and critiques); Amelia ThomSJn-DeVeaux, When Abortion Was 
Only Legal in 6 States, FivEfHIRlYEIGHT (Aug. 28, 2014), https:/,fivet hirtyeight.c:om/datalablwhen-
abortion-was-only-legal-in-{)-states (discussing pre Roe v. Wade state abortion laws) . 
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of law and lawyers. 13 1 This perception of legal involvement in social change 
activity has no~ however, been universally extolled. In fac~ the role of the law 
and of lawyers has been hotly debated There emerged during this period both 
an internal and an external critique of this understanding of the role of law and 
lawyers. 
The internal critique carne from both the right and the left. On the right, there 
was a backlash agains t government-funded lawyers bringing suits against the 
government for the benefit of, primarily, poor people, 132 as well as a critique of 
unelected judges overturning law developed by elected legislatures. 133 On the 
left, much of the critique came from some progressive lawyers and legal 
academics who were skeptical about lawyers pursuing soc ial change through 
the creation or extension of legal rights . 134 My own view is that while the 
obtaining of formal legal rights has sometimes served a symbolic purpose, it has 
also served to detour and to slow down more fundamental and enduring 
change 135 Too often, the achievement of new or expanded rights has been 
131. See, e.g. , Michael W. McCann, Reftmz Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 715 
(1992); MIOiAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994); William N. E!kridge, k ., Oumneling: 
Identity-Based Social Movenzents and Public Law, 150 U. PA . L. REv. 419, 422 (200 1) ('Tre 9:>Cial 
movements literature does not adequately reflect the importance oflaw. "). 
132. In realtem1s, tre Legal SeiVires Corporation, tre organization that funds many oftre bcal 
legal setVices offices aromd the oou.ntcy, has seen its budget plummet during tre period from 2012 
through 2015 to its lowest level sinre its inreption and less than half of what it was in tre early 1980s. 
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2015 : lEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NuMBERS:THE DATA 
UNDERLYING LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 3- 13 (2016). www.lsc.govnsc-2015-numbers. For a good hi~OIV 
of legal seiVires, see ALAN W. HOUSMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSIS'D\NCE IN THE UNllED STATES (Qr. for Law and Soc. Pol'v 3d 
ed. 2013) (2007); see also Alan Houseman, A Front-Lines R~{lection on Early Legal Services: 
Lawyering to EndPoverty,22 G!O. J. ONPOVER1Y L. & POL'Y 469(2015). 
133. Of t he twentieth-<:entlll)' crilicsof"activi~" judges, perhaps none was more significant than 
Alexander M. Bid<el See, e.g. , THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:THE &JI>REME COURT A TTHE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16- 23 (1962). Bickel's position was carried forward in Chief Just ire Roberts' s dissent in 
Obergefell v . Hodges, in which he said: 
Under~and well what this dissent is abott : It is not abott whether, in my 
judgment , tre in~itttion of marriage should be changed to include sante-sex 
couples. It is instead aoott whether, in our democratic republic, that decision 
should re~ with the people acting through treir elected representatives, or with 
five la'"')'ers who happen to hold commissions mthorizing trem to re9:>lve legal 
disoutes according to law. 
Obergefell, 135 S. 0 . at 2612(2015). 
134. While it is rot my wal in this paper to elucidate the debate, I would like to point olt sorreof 
the leading literature on the subject. For an early critique of the push for rights by a ron-legal ocademic, 
see STuART A. SCHEIN GOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE (1974). See also GERALD N . ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CbURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL GiANGE? ( 1991). For a pro-rights perspective, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, R!GHTSATWORK: 
PAY EQUilY RER:>RMANO THE POLITICS OF lEGAL MoBILIZATI)N (1994). Much, btt mrdly all, of the 
debate an10ng la'"')'ers and legal academl:s has been between proponents of a crit ical legal studies 
penpective and proponents of a critical rare penpective. For a CLS perspective, see Gabel and Harris, 
supra note 8. For a critical rare penpective, see Patri:ia 1. Williams, Alchenz ical l\'otes: Reconstmcting 
Ideals from Dea:mstmdedRiglzts, 22 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 401 (1987). 
13 5. For anotrer critique oftre ri!flts-creation proress, see Derrick A. Bell, k ., Brawn v. Boa ttl of 
Education and d1e lnterest-Convetgen ce Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) (arguing that rights 
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perceived by many, especially many progressive lawyers, to be the end of the 
struggle ratha- than a step, and typically a not-too-central step, in an ongoing 
political process. 
I envision, instead, a multifaceted process whose goal would be to shift power 
to the advantage of tha;e who currently suffer from a powa- deficit due to 
issues such as race, class, or gender. While this process m~ involve some legal 
issues and legal actions, it is not, essentially, a legal process. To contemplate 
such a process, of course, requires one also to contemplate the meaning of 
power and how it operates in society because how one views powa- will inform 
how one attempts to shift power. In 1he remainder of 1his section, I will discuss 
my view of power, how power can be acquired and used by 1he disenfranchised, 
and the role that law and lawyers can play in such a process. 
a Power Revisited 
While there is little doubt that there remains in American society a level of 
conscious discrimination and intentional oppression, it is also likely that much 
of 1he disadvantage suffered by the poor and by people of color is the result of 
factors other than overt, intentional bias. In many cases the oppression results 
from long-standing societal norms that have been internalized by large numbers 
of otherwise well-intentioned people. These norms often, if not invariably, 
originated long ago with the conscious behavior of individuals or group; who 
were then exercising their agency. These intentioned behaviors and the norms 
upon which they were based were reproduced over time, often U1consciously, 
by many subsequent agents and thus became embedded in society ' s fabric. In 
other words, they became social structures within the culture. Recall, for 
example, Iris Marion Young's description of Sandy's ordeal. The problem, of 
course, is that if the problems Sandy faced are caused by structures within the 
society, how can tha;e who are subject to the structures overcome or change 
them? 
In this regard, recall Giddens ' s theory of structuration. Structures and their 
operation that have become part of the practical consciousness knowledge (or 
epistemes or habitus) of the culture would naturally be replicated ffi instinctual 
responses to various stimuli. In order to modify these responses, the practical 
consciousness from which they result must be converted to a discursive 
consciousness. The culture must be brought to confront its own embedded 
beliefs and practices so that the instinctual will be brought into discursive 
engagement. Of course, attempting to bring practical consciousness to a 
discursive state is not always (or even often) successful. There is typically a 
discursive rationale for the way things are such that the pooition of the 
are created for blacks only when the interests represented by those rights converge with the interests of 
whites). 
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oppressed may not prevail. Perhaps even more likely, an attempt at rational 
discourse may result in anon-discursive political backlash. 136 
How can disadvantaged people bring about the necessary discourse in order 
to change pra;tical consciousness knowledge? The answer lies in widespread 
resistance to the established norms. This resistance can take various forms 
including lobbying and litigation seeking change but also, and more effectively, 
by organizing social and political resistance.137 I have already discussed the idea 
of social movements and more localized pressure group; as being an important 
part of social change But these vffiicles for change are complex and require 
significant resources- people, money, and outside support- in order to have a 
chance for success. They also require a coherent and coordinated strategy to 
achieve clearly articulated goals . 
Part of that strategy normally includes very public activities and displays that 
disrupt business as usual. As William H Simon, channeling Richard Cloward 
and Frances Fox Piven, has pointed ou~ one of the important resources 
possessed by the poor is their ability to disrupt through boycotts, 
demonstrations, riots , or more conventional action such as strikes or electoral 
rebellion. 138 Similarly, Tomiko Brown-Nagin has said that "social movements 
attain leverage in the political and legal processes by engaging in disruptive 
protest oction taken outside of institutionalized political structures. " 139 She adds, 
"Social movement octivity is chara;terized by organization, cohesion, and 
agenda setting .. .. They commonly use direct action, such as demonstrations, 
marches, or sit-ins; community organizing, which typically includes community 
education, or 'consciousness-raising' sessions; and petitioning and 
pamphleteering to achieve the movement's goals . " 140 
These disruptive activities would normally be accompanied by media 
campaigns, a;tivities such as teach-ins, and legal assaults on the statu:; quo. The 
goal would be to call attention to the plight of the poor and to highlight desired 
solutions-in other words, to change the nature of the discourse relating to the 
issues raised These octs of de-structuration are attempts, once again to use 
Giddens 's concepts , to convert proctical consciousness into discursive 
136. Note, for exampk:, the coverage of President Tnmp' s re!ponse to the order by United Sates 
District Judge James Robart temporarily re!iraining the implementation of Trump's Execuive Order 
imposing a travel ban. Trump said, via Twitter, "The opinion of this ro-calledjudge, whi::h essentially 
takes law-enforcement away from our COI.Ultry, is ridiculous and will be overturned!" Yeganeh Torbati 
& Steve Holland, Tromp: U.S. Will Win Appeal of Judge 's Travel Ban Otder, REuTERS (Feb. 5, 2017), 
http://www.reuters.com/artick:/us-usa-tnmp-immigration-idUSKBN15Il CM. This kind of re!ponse 
attempts to negate the discourse thatmightchange societal views and norms. 
137. See generally Wex1er, SJpra rote 8; Mich~l Diamond, low, the Problems of Poverty. mul 
the "Myd1 of Rights," 1980 BYU L. REv. 785 (1980); WilliamP . Quigley, Reflections of Community 
Organizers: lowyering fOr Empowemzent of Community Of8animtions, 21 OHn N.U. L. REv. 455 
(1994). 
138 . William H Simon, THE COMMUNilY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MoW:MENT: LAw, 
BUSINESS, AND TI:IE NEw SOCIAL POLICY 59 (2001). See also Diamord, Paradox, supra note 11. 
139. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, co1d the Law: The Case of AjJimlative 
Action, 105 COLUM L. REV. 1436, 1489 (2005). 
140. /d. at 1504. 
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consciousness. But given a movement's need for organization and its basic 
strategy of disruption, how can the law and its practitioners meaningfully and 
effectively participate? I turn to this question in the next section. 
b. Law, Lawyers, and Mobilization 
As I mentioned in the previous section, social movements often operate 
outside of normal legal and political channels. 141 They typically involve direct 
appeals to the public and to various policy makers, often through disruptive, 
occasionally turbulent activities. 142 If this is an accurate depiction of social 
movement behavior, it is markedly distinct from the traditional activities of 
lawyers, who normally follow heavily prescribed procedures within a 
significantly cabined range of activities. This is particularly true in the highly 
formalized arenas of courts and litigation where, as Brown-Nagin points out, 
lawyers must translate the claims of movements into the language of the law. 143 
But even more fundamentally , law is, at its heart, a conservative discipline. 
It is geared toward preserving the status quo and permitting only slow-moving, 
evolutionary change. Derrick A Bell, Jr. has argued that even then, change in 
the area of civil rights will come only if it is acceptable to the white elites in 
whooe favor the political apparatus operates. 144 A similar theoretical assessmmt 
could also be applied to other struggles of disadvantaged groups. Thus, if this 
analysis is appooite, movements supporting the claims of such groups must 
make the cost of opposing those claims sufficiently high so that it would be in 
the interest of an opposing group to accede to the demands of the insurgent 
group. Law plays a part, but only a small part, in increasing the coot of 
opposition. 145 Lawyers, however, might have a bigger part to play than the law 
itself. Even here, however, the role of lawyers is a supporting, not a starring, 
one. 
141. See supra notes 123-27 ard theaccom!XInyingtext. 
142 . For a personal accotmt of the role dissonance of a lawyer representing people within a 
disruptive movement octivity, see Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I /1!/y Client? 7he Role Con.fitsion of a Lawyer 
Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1996). 
143. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 139, at 1509. Forfmther discussions of a lawyer attemptingto 
fit s:>cial or political issues into a legal context, see Clark D. Cmnin~am , The Law;er as Tmnslator, 
Representation as Text: Towards an Etlmography of Legal Discrmrse, 77 CORNElL L. REv. 1298 
(1992). 
144. See Bell, supm note 135, at 523. Note here that Bell is ass\IIling a controlling grot", a point 
that is contelted in this essay. Nevertheless, the point is telling in that the group to be disalilantaged by 
the success of the movement will fight again& that sucress with the resomces at its disposal. Among 
the strategies that Bell identifies is fort he elites to concede on points when it is in their interelt to do s:>, 
inc1udingthe possibility of concession on minor points to defuse conflict on more m~orpoints. 
145. Brown-Nagin has criticized scholars of s:>cial movements and the law by ltating that gr:::h 
"scoo1ars overeltimateth: positive influence that legal rhetoric and nonns have on s:>cial movements as 
they evolve. In the process, legal scholars pe1petuate jurirentrism and encourage the tendency among 
lawyers representing social movements to privilege con&itutionallitigation. But cons:itutionaJ law has 
hiS:oricany been a limited and unreliable agent of diltribttive jultire." Brown-Nagin, s1pm note 139, 
at 1489. 
No. 3] The Transposition ofPower 349 
If the law is not (and, in my view, it should not be) a primary aspect of 
social movements, what is the proper role of a lawyer involved with such a 
movement? Lawyers certainly have skills that are relevant to the needs of social 
movements . They can do careful and deep analysis; they have familiarity with 
approaches to decision makers ; they certainly can describe the parameters of 
current law. Some are personally connected to the movements they are attoched 
to as professionals . This may give them added insight and sensitivity to the 
movement's goals and aspirations . 146 Lawyers, however, are not alone in 
offering such skills and sensitivities. In foct, the baggage that many lawyers 
bring with them may push movements in a more legalistic direction than might 
be optimal. 
Nevertheless, much of social movement scholarship, and nearly all of legal 
scholarship that is concerned with social movements, puts lawyers and, to a 
great extent, litigation at the forefront of, and indispensable to, such 
movements. But as Brown-Nagin has said: 
In ascribing such vast capa;ities to lawyers or constitutional 
text as mobilizing agents, or assigning judges the role of 
"necessary safety valve" "channeling" movements in 
"assimilative directions," legal scholarship overlooks the 
charocteristics of social movements that make them unique. 
These scholars minimize the differences between the form and 
sub5tance of legal processes and concepts, and the form and 
purposes of participatory democratic action. In fact, there are 
profound differences between most forms and ta;tics of 
lawyering and social movement activity .... Ultimately, I posit 
a normative vision in which social movements preserve their 
own social and political identities and spaces; movements 
approach Jaw and lawyers deliberately and strategically, if at all 
. ... By design and character, I argue, social movements are 
more likely to achieve their goals when they are free from the 
constraints imposed by law and lawyers. 147 
While I awee with Brown-Nagin' s view of law, lawyers , and social 
movements, I believe that her views are based on an historical view of what 
lawyers do and how they do it. In that view, lawyers are trained in an adversary 
process where the adversary is largely known. If my view of power, which is 
essentially a post-structuralist view, is substantially descriptive of the political 
and legal landscap~ the adversary often will not be known Moreover, the 
embedded pra;tical consciousness know ledge of the majority in society will be 
a looming ob5tacle to significant social change. Therefore, in order for social 
movements to succeed, they must convert that knowledge into a discursive 
146. But see Polikoff,supranote 142,for a morenuancedviewofsuch a relationship. 
147. Brown-Nagin, supranote 139,at 1502. 
350 The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law& PoJjcy (Vol. XXIV 
consciousness, one that requires the m~ority to critically examine their beliefs 
and understandings . People must change their views, and this is not, 
fundamentally, a goal that lawyers are trained to accomplish and is not one that 
most lawyers are interested in taking on. Again referring to Brown-Nagin, 
Generally speaking, lawyers are not well positioned to mobilize 
communities because of their commitment to legal processes. Consequently, the 
ability of communities to leverage the law for social change should not be 
understood as a power resting with attorneys. Lawyers- litigators , in 
particular-must be willing to cede leadership of movements for change to 
nonlawyers . 148 
The question is whether "ceding" leadership would be sufficient. Lawyers, 
to be useful to movements, must convert their own practical consciousness into 
a discursive one They must consider jettisoning their traditional role and 
traditional mindset from a formal worldview in which law, with its 
conservative, evolutionary approach, is paramount to one in which actual 
change on the ground is the dominant goal. Duncan Kennedy aptly stated the 
nature of the problem when movement lawyers ptmue rights. He said, "The 
rights were usually defmed in terms of equality, but equality in a spocial sense. 
They did not involve the demand for equality in the distribution of income or 
wealth between social classes, regions, or communities, but rather ' equal 
protoction' for individual members of previously subordinated social 
groups. " 149 
The changes that are needed are ones that pre-date the law. They involve a 
reconfiguring of the social compact. This means that lawyers must come to 
understand how they "might intervene 'critically ' in the field as a progressive 
intellectual without being either hemmed in by the limits of the professional 
vocabulary or consigned to play the role of outsider or gadfly. " 150 
So, while killing all the lawyers is not the solution to formalistic , rights-
driven social movements , a radicallegalectomy might be appropriate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ideas about power have undergone a long, thoughtful, and varied analysis , 
particularly over the past half-century. Similarly, the role of lawyers , espocially 
lawyers for the oppressed, has gone through a similar analysis . These ideas 
come together in a discussion of social movements. Today, it is not uncommon 
to discuss power as an anonymous set of social forces rather than the property 
of a privileged class (although that form of power is still discussed and is often 
observable in today' s political culture). Similarly, it is not uncommoo for 
148./d. at 1521. 
149. Dmcan Kennedy, The Critique oJRights in Critical Legal Sh1clies , in LEFTLEGALISM.ILEFr 
CRillQUE 178, 182 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eels., 2002). 
150. David Kennedy , When Renewal Repeal~ Thinking against/he Box, in L EFT L EGALISM/LEFT 
CRlllQUE, supra note 149, at 373,373. 
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people to think of lawyers engaging in tasks far beyond what was their 
traditional domain. Today, lawyers engage in community organizing and 
education, strategic planning with oppressed grouiJ5, and overtly political action 
on behalf of clients. Bringing the changing views of power together with the 
changing views of the role of lawyers leaves a space for an effective 
collaboration between those suffering from a power deficit and the lawyers who 
wish to ffisist in that effort It requires lawyers to give up the idea that rights 
creation is the only, or even the main, way of achieving progress. It also 
requires movement leaders, and the lawyers who assist them, to do a careful 
analysis of the nature of the power that is arrayed against them and to develop 
appropriate strategies to combat that power. Law and lawyers can have a role in 
this process, but it must be secondruy to that of the participants and leaders of 
the movements themselves. It mu;t also avoid confining the disruptive energy 
of movements into the cabined and energy-depleting processes ofthe law. 

